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cial development for international trade. This paper investigates whether fi-
nancial constraints matter for foreign market entry at the firm level using dy-
namicpaneldatatechniques.Theempiricalframeworkisappliedtoapanelof
French manufacturing firms over the years 1998–2005.Although financial in-
dicators are significantly correlated with export status and export share,there
is no evidence that financial constraints have a direct impact on foreign mar-
ket participation or sales in foreign markets once observed and unobserved
firm heterogeneity is controlled for. This result also holds for subgroups of
firms that are more likely to face financial constraints and industries that are
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1 Introduction 
Increasing export activities have long been accepted as an important element of growth. Thus, 
governments in most industrialized countries have seriously engaged in enhancing 
international trade. Their efforts comprise, among others, the abolishment of trade barriers, 
the provision of export counselling and financial assistance for export activities. A particular 
prominent measure for fostering exports is the improvement of the liquidity of firms which 
aim to engage in international trade, by trade credits, debt guarantees or subsidized bank loans 
(see e.g. Auboin and Meier-Ewert 2004). Yet, it is not at all clear, whether these measures 
actually matter for the decision to enter foreign markets. This can only be the case, if liquidity 
constraints are a serious impediment for this decision and if government support is substantial 
enough to overcome them.  
Economic theory provides some, albeit limited guidance to this question. Only recently the 
new trade theory has incorporated firm heterogeneity into models of international trade to 
explain why, within industries, some firms engage internationally and others do not (Melitz 
2003, Helpman et al. 2004). In addition, the empirical literature has recognized several firm-
level determinants of foreign market participation such as productivity, size, innovation 
activities and product differentiation (see Greenaway and Kneller 2007 for an overview). 
From a theoretical point of view there are at least two reasons why one may also expect that 
financial factors matter for export activities. First, recent theoretical models stress the role of 
financial markets for international trade. A well developed financial system is regarded as a 
prerequisite to reach an optimal capital stock and to exploit economies of scale in certain 
industries (see e.g. Beck 2002). This in turn may help to achieve a comparative advantage and 
to create foreign demand for the produced goods. Second, exporting involves sunk costs such 
as product customization or investment in marketing, logistics and distribution networks 
(Roberts and Tybout 1997). Thus, only firms with sufficient liquidity may be able to cover 
these costs.  
As firms are quite heterogeneous, it seems that the concrete relationship between productivity 
and liquidity matters. Along these lines, a recent theoretical approach by Chaney (2005) 
predicts that financial constraints may affect foreign market entry, but acknowledges that 
whether and how much trade is impeded by financial constraints depends on the distribution 
of productivity and liquidity across firms. Hence, the question of whether financial constraints 5
matter for international trade – and whether, consequently, economic policy carries the 
potential to overcome them – boils down to an empirical question. 
The empirical literature is, at best, only suggestive regarding this question. While some papers 
find evidence for a positive impact of financial development on trade on a macroeconomic 
level (see Beck 2002, Becker and Greenberg 2005 among others), micro econometric 
evidence is sparse and the results are mixed. Du and Girma (2007) find that the availability of 
bank loans affects firms’ export share in China, while Greenaway et al. (2007) find that firms 
that start exporting in the U.K. are not characterized by higher liquidity than other firms. 
Espanol (2007) reports a negative correlation between financial obstacles to innovation and a 
firm’s export status. 
The purpose of this paper is to test whether financial constraints matter for foreign market 
participation and sales in foreign markets at the firm level. In contrast to previous work, the 
empirical framework in this paper will explicitly control for unobserved heterogeneity and 
allow for endogenous initial conditions. This paper is organized as follows. In section two, 
previous literature on international trade and financial markets is discussed. Section three 
describes the empirical model and section four provides a description of the data. Results of 
the empirical analysis are presented in section five, section six concludes.  
2 Related Literature 
The empirical finance literature has found that financial constraints matter for firm investment 
and that the impact of financial constraints varies considerably across countries (Bond et al. 
2003). Since foreign market entry involves sunk costs, one may expect that financial factors 
affect exporting decisions. However it is usually found that financial constraints only matter 
for certain types of firm, usually smaller and younger firms. Exporters are usually found to be 
larger and especially more productive than their competitors that operate solely on the 
domestic market (see Wagner 2007 for an overview). The theoretical justification for this 
observation is that exporting is only feasible if a certain productivity threshold is reached. 
This is because exporting also incorporates higher variable costs than domestic sales due to 
transport costs and costs of the “liability of foreignness”, i.e. unfamiliarity with the foreign 
market and disadvantages compared to local producers because of the limited ability to 6
provide after sales services. Hence, it is not clear whether financial constraints matter for 
those firms that could profitably export otherwise.  
For the same reasons, a recent theoretical approach by Chaney (2005) argues that financial 
constraints may only be binding for the exporting decision for firms within a certain 
productivity range. The framework builds on models of international trade with 
heterogeneous firms (Melitz 2002, Helpman et al. 2004) in which foreign market participation 
is determined by productivity. It is assumed that foreign market entry involves sunk costs. If 
financial markets are incomplete, only those firms that either generate enough liquidity from 
their domestic sales or have access to external finance are able to export. The model argues 
that financial constraints are only binding for firms with intermediate productivity, since for 
firms with low productivity exporting is not profitable anyway and firms with a very high 
productivity will always generate enough internal funds to finance the sunk costs of 
exporting.
2
The macroeconomic literature has stressed the importance of financial development for 
growth in general (Rajan and Zingales 1998) and for the development of international trade in 
particular. In the macroeconomic trade literature the impact of financial constraints on exports 
has been used as an explanation for the low response of exports to movements in exchange 
rates (see e.g. Blalock and Roy 2007). Beck (2002) provides another theoretical argument 
why trade may be influenced by financial constraints. Building on models by Heckscher-
Ohlin and Ricardo he shows that a well developed financial system may help a country to 
gain competitive advantage in goods that are characterized by economies of scale. The reason 
is that only if financial constraints are low, a country is able to achieve its desired capital 
stock. Beck (2002) also provides empirical evidence for his theory using country-level data. 
In Beck (2003) these results are confirmed using industry-level data, where he finds that 
countries with better developed financial systems have higher export shares in industries that 
use external finance to a large extent. Similar results are obtained by Manova (2005) and 
others. Becker and Greenberg (2005) stress the importance of external finance for trade via its 
importance for R&D and innovation activities that are important for foreign market entry.  
Transactions in international trade are commonly conducted by payment within 180 days of 
delivery. This introduces some uncertainty for the exporter whether the customer’s payment 
                                                
2 Sunk costs for foreign market entry may be substantial. Das et al. (2007) develop a structural model of 
exporting decisions and estimate average sunk costs of more than 400,000 US $ for Columbian industries. 7
will indeed arrive (Stephens 1999). For instance, importers may become insolvent and hence 
default on the export contract. Further, trade with some countries may be subject to political 
risks. In line of this reasoning many countries provide trade credits to ensure exporters against 
the risk of international market transactions. Moser et al. (2006) conclude that “Hermes trade 
credits” in Germany have increased exports on an aggregate level. Görg et al. (2007) argue 
that export grants in Ireland have increased the export share of exporting firms but were not 
able to turn non-exporters into exporters. A positive effect of subsidized export loans in 
Pakistan on export participation of smaller firms is reported by Zia (2008). Market 
intervention may however only be justified if firms are hindered from exporting by financial 
constraints. Baltensperger and Herger (2007) find that export insurance schemes in OECD 
countries have increased trade only to high and middle income countries for which only 
moderate commercial and political risks exist. Thus they argue that these kind of insurance 
schemes may give rise to adverse incentives for exporting, i.e. too risky engagements. 
On the micro level Van Biesenbroeck (2005) reports that after controlling for size, exporters 
in African countries have the same access to credit as firms that operate only domestically. 
Campa and Shaver (2002) as well as Guariglia and Mateut (2005) find that firms that operate 
globally are less likely to face financial constraints than other firms. However, the focus of 
their analysis is rather causality from exports to liquidity than vice versa. Thus, it is unclear 
whether firms become exporters because they are not financially constrained, i.e. whether 
financial constraints matter for foreign market entry.  
Greenaway et al. (2007) were the first to test the importance of variables that reflect financial 
constraints in static and dynamic models of export market participation. They find that 
liquidity is positively correlated with export participation. Once they take state dependence in 
export market participation into account this effect becomes insignificant. They argue that 
differences in financial performance between exporters and non-exporters are more 
pronounced after firms have entered a foreign market. Analyzing survey data Espanol (2007) 
reports that firms invest in training, innovation activities and environmental issues to gain 
access to foreign markets or to increase exports. To evaluate the impact of financial 
constraints Espanol (2007) uses a similar empirical strategy as Greenaway et al. (2007) where 
financial factors are mainly accounted for by using indicators for financial obstacles to 
innovation. Hence this study rather estimates indirect effects of financial constraints via 
innovation to foreign market entry. However the nonlinear estimation techniques used in both 8
studies do not allow for correlation between unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity on the 
one hand and liquidity or previous export status on the other hand. Using a static model for 
pooled cross-sections, Du and Girma (2007) find that access to bank loans in China is 
correlated with firms´ export share.  
Unobserved heterogeneity may be important if unobserved factors such as managerial ability, 
corporate culture and attitudes towards risk affect both foreign market entry and a firm’s 
liquidity. Accounting for the dynamic aspects of exporting has been found to be crucial in 
analyzing export determinants (see e.g. Roberts and Tybout 1997). Thus, both unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependence will be accounted for in the empirical analysis. The 
importance of financial factors for both export status and export intensity is analyzed and the 
robustness of the results is checked by the use of different financial indicators, different 
estimation techniques and an application of the empirical framework to various sub-groups of 
firms. 
3 Empirical Framework 
  3.1 A Model for export decisions 
The empirical strategy builds on the sunk cost model of exporting that was introduced by 
Roberts and Tybout (1997) and was widely applied (see e.g. Bernard and Wagner 2001, 
Bernard and Jensen 2004). Profits from exporting for firm i in period t are given by: 
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
,1 ,1
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Where  it p  is the price at which goods can be sold in the foreign market and  it q  denotes the 
firm-specific profit maximizing quantity of exports. The costs that result from exporting 
consist of variable costs  it c  of producing, selling and shipping the good and  it s  denote sunk 
costs that have to be paid when a foreign market is entered.  it dEX  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the firm exports in period t.9
it x denotes a vector of firm-specific variables that includes among other things size, 
productivity and product characteristics. it f is a financial indicator that reflects the availability 
of internal financial resources and the costs at which external finance is available. For a 
financially constrained firm obtaining external finance is not possible or only possible at 
prohibitively high costs. Such a firm can only invest or meet the sunk costs of foreign market 
entry if it has sufficiently internal finance available. Indeed, in the presence of sunk costs 
foreign market entry can be interpreted as an investment. Since foreign market entry takes 
time, the profit function depends on internal finance at t-1.  t z  is a vector of macroeconomic 
factors such as exchange rates and the state of the business cycle.  
A firm will choose its sequence of future desired export levels {}
th
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δ denotes a discount factor and h the firm’s planning horizon. The optimal level of exports in 
period t can be expressed as the value  it q that solves the following Bellman equation: 
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A firm will export in period t, i.e. will choose a level of  it q >0, if the expected revenue from 
exporting exceeds the costs, hence if  
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 3.2  Estimation 
Thus, it is crucial to control for firms’ past export status in the empirical specification, since 
only firms that did not export in the previous year have to pay the sunk costs when a foreign 10
market is entered.
3 Further, other sources of state dependence such as customer loyalty or 
persistence in firm success are possible. If financial factors are crucial in obtaining a 
competitive advantage, they may affect expected revenues and variable costs and hence, they 
may be relevant for all firms. But if financial factors only affect the height of the sunk costs 
they will only be relevant for firms that did not export in the previous year. Therefore, 
alternative empirical specifications are used. The first approach simply controls for previous 
year’s export status and the second approach allows the impact of financial factors to differ 
between incumbents and potential entrants. Estimation of the determinants of firms’ export 
status is undertaken in a discrete choice framework, where a non-structural approach is 
chosen to identify the impact of financial constraints.  
The following empirical model is specified: 
1, 1 1 if  0            =1,... ,        =1,...
0    else.
it i t it t i it
it
dEX f x z i N t T
dEX
γφ β µ ε −− ⎧ ++ + + + > ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
i µ  is unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity and  it ε  is an idiosyncratic error that is 
assumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated with the regressors.  t z  consists of a 
vector of time dummies that captures macroeconomic factors. It is assumed that both  ,1 it f −
and  it x  are strictly exogenous conditional on  i µ . If the estimate of φ  is positive and 
significant, this is interpreted as evidence for financial constraints, which follows the 
literature on financial constraints and investment.
Two major problems have to be solved, the treatment of the unobserved heterogeneity and 
especially its relation to the covariates and the initial condition of the export status. Several 
approaches have been proposed to deal with dynamic discrete choice models. An approach 
proposed by Heckman (1981) suggests specifying a conditional distribution for the initial 
condition, while Wooldridge (2005) suggests specifying a distribution of the unobserved 
heterogeneity, conditional on observed covariates and the initial condition, as a generalization 
of the Chamberlain (1980) and Mundlack (1978) estimators for correlated random effects. 
The Wooldridge (2005) estimator has an advantage in the case of panel attrition. In contrast to 
the Heckman (1981) estimator, attrition is allowed to depend on the initial condition. This is a 
                                                
3 Previous empirical work finds that only the first lag of a firm’s export status is a significant predictor of current 
export status (see e.g. Roberts and Tybout 1997).  11
major advantage since a lot of observations have to be deleted as the estimation techniques do 
not allow the use of panels with gaps.  
Hence, I follow Wooldridge (2005) and assume a distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity 
that allows unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity to be correlated with the initial condition 
and moments of the covariates. In particular it is assumed that unobserved heterogeneity can 
be expressed as a linear combination of firm-specific time averages of the regressors and the 
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Estimation can be carried out by a standard random effects Probit model with  0 i dEX , i x  and 
i f  as additional regressors. Time-invariant variables like industry dummies are added to the 
model to decrease the error variance and appear either in the vector  it x  or in  i x .  
In all specification lagged values of the financial indicators are used. This is to allow for a 
time lag between financial development and the export decision, since planning and 
realization of foreign market entry and expansion might take time. The use of lagged values 
also reduces simultaneity problems. If switching the export status involves sunk costs, 
exporting may also affect financial variables to some extent.
4 The problem of simultaneity is 
only reduced but not completely resolved by the use of lagged variables since the model 
assumes strict exogeneity of the regressors conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity. 
Strictly speaking this rules out feedback from exporting to future values of the regressors, in 
                                                
4 The main results of this paper were not sensitive to using contemporaneous instead of lagged values of the 
regressors.  12
particular if the number of time periods is small.
5 On the one hand this might be a minor 
problem, since recent evidence shows that causality rather runs from exporting to firm 
performance than vice versa.
6 On the other hand feedback and other sources of endogeneity 
cannot be completely ruled out. 
To check whether the results are sensitive to the assumption of strict exogeneity, results from 
the dynamic Probit model are compared with those of linear dynamic panel data models 
estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM), where lagged values of the 
regressors are used as instruments. In particular the “System GMM” estimator (Arellano and 
Bover 1998) is used. The validity of the instruments is checked by appropriate over-
identification and autocorrelation tests.  
In an extension of the model, separate equations for incumbents and potential entrants into 
foreign markets are estimated to allow for a parameter vector that differs between these 
groups. When estimating a separate equation for incumbents or potential entrants one has to 
consider that either group of firms is not a random sample from the population. Hence, the 
problem is treated as one of endogenous sample selection. In year t information is only used 
for those firms that did (not) export in the previous year. Estimation is carried out in a Probit 
model with endogenous selection. The dependent variable in the selection equation equals one 
for firms that did (not) export in the previous year and the independent variables are lagged 
values of the regressors of the basic specification (without previous year’s export status). It is 
assumed that the joint distribution of the error terms of the two equations is bivariate normal. 
The model is estimated on pooled data for all years and not in a random effects model to keep 
the analysis simple.
7 Hence, previous year’s export status is treated as the initial condition. 
Again, firm specific time averages of the time variant variables are included in the model to 
allow for a correlation between these variables and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.  
In alternative specifications, the impact of financial variables on export intensity measured as 
the export share (export sales divided by total sales) is examined. This can be interpreted as a 
measure of success in foreign markets. Sunk costs may only be relevant if a firm exports a 
                                                
5 A framework to account for feedback in dynamic nonlinear models was proposed by Wooldridge (2000). 
However, the model becomes intractable if there are a large number of predetermined variables and it does not 
account for other potential sources of endogeneity.
6 For an overview see Engel and Procher (2007) or Wagner (2007). 
7 The empirical strategy is similar to Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) and Stewart and Swaffiled (1999) who 
analyze transition probabilities between different income groups. 13
substantial amount and the costs probably differ substantially across foreign markets. Hence, 
an alternative interpretation of the export share is that significant increases in export sales 
proxy the development of a new market. Since a lot of firms have zero exports, left censoring 
has to be taken into account. The export share is modelled by the following equation: 
,1 ,1 max 0, . it i t i t it i it EXshare EXshare f x γφ β µ ε −− ⎡ ⎤ =+ + + + ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
       
Estimation is therefore carried out in a dynamic random effects Tobit model. Analogous to the 
dynamic Probit model I follow the framework proposed by Wooldridge (2005) and assume 
that: 
01 0 23 ii i i i EXshare x f a µαα αα =+ + + +          , 
() ()
2
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2
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Strictly speaking, the export share is also right censored, but in the sample used for estimation 
there are only five firm-year observations with an export share of one (less than 0.003%), 
hence I treat the distribution as left-censored only. Both the random effect Probit and the 
random effect Tobit models are fitted by the adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 12 
integration points. 
4 Data and Model Specification 
  4.1 Data  
The data set used in this paper is extracted from the AMADEUS database, a commercial 
database that provides information on financial data as well as ownership and subsidiary 
information.
8 The financial data include balance sheet items and information from profit and 
loss accounts – which include export sales in some countries – and are collected from 
company reports which are supplemented by specialized regional information providers. 
Further, among other variables, AMADEUS includes information about employment, 
industry, legal form and date of incorporation. The AMADEUS database has been used in 
numerous empirical studies on internationalization topics (Budd et al. 2004, Konings and 
Murphy 2006, Helpman et al. 2004, to mention a few).  
                                                
8 AMADEUS is provided by Bureau van Dijk. For the empirical analysis update numbers 88, 113, 136 and 146 
are used. 14
AMADEUS includes information on roughly 8 million European firms. Since data 
availability varies considerably across countries, this paper restricts the analysis to French 
firms. Especially data on exports are available for a representative sample of firms for few 
countries only. The empirical analysis is further restricted to manufacturing firms. One reason 
is to obtain a sample of rather homogenous firms. Second, exporting in service sectors may be 
completely different from manufacturing since not all goods are tradable and classifying the 
tradability of goods is difficult with balance sheet data. Further, as pointed out by Beck (2002) 
external finance may especially be relevant for industries with increasing returns to scale, 
which are mostly manufacturing industries. 
Firms with missing information on key variables like export sales, financial indicators, 
employment and value added were deleted from the sample. A few observations had to be 
dropped because of implausible values such as negative values of value added or export sales. 
Further, the upper and lower 0.5%-quantile of all monetary variables was deleted from the 
sample to eliminate coding errors and extraordinary firm shocks from the sample. After the 
data cleaning process around 280,000 firm-year observations are left for the analysis. The 
available time period spans the years 1998 to 2005. Since the preferred estimation method is 
not applicable to panels with gaps, the number of firm-year observations reduces to about 
200,000.  
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the key variables used in this study including 
variable definitions and Table A1 shows the distribution of exporters across industries. About 
one third of all firm are exporters and the average export share is 6.3 %. Several financial 
indicators were extracted from the data set. Two of these were also used by Greenaway et al. 
(2007) in the context of financial constraints and exports. The first one is a measure of 
liquidity which is defined as the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities to total assets. 
This liquidity ratio proxies the availability of internal resources, but should also be negatively 
correlated with the costs at which external finance is available. The second measure refers to a 
firm’s leverage and is defined as the long term debt to total assets ratio. The cash flow to 
capital ratio, which is the most common indicator in the literature on financial constraints and 
firm investment, indicates the availability of internal finance. A further indicator, the coverage 
ratio, which is defined as earnings before interest and tax payments (EBIT) divided by interest 
payment, indicates a firm’s ability to meet short term liabilities. This measure is inversely 15
related to a firm’s riskiness and can thus be interpreted as a proxy for the costs firms have to 
pay for external finance (Guariglia 1999). 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
     Exporters  Non-exporters 
Variable  Description  Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev.
liquidity ratio  (Current assets - current liabilities)/ 
total assets 
0.225 0.256  0.140 0.300 
leverage  long term liabilities / total assets  0.171  0.150  0.230  0.180 
coverage ratio  Earnings before interest and taxes / 
interest payments 
15.044 30.270  14.218 26.848 
cashflow ratio  Cash flow / tangible fixed assets  0.836  1.071  0.836  1.084 
log (size)  log number of employees  3.055  1.468  1.870  1.222 
log(productivity)  log value added per employee   4.438  0.600  4.151  0.605 
d(R&D)   =1, if firm reports intangible assets  0.696  0.460  0.541  0.498 
log (R&D)  log intangible assets, if d(R&D)=1  3.280 2.050  2.961 1.769 
log (capital)  log  (tangible  fixed  assets)  4.810 2.142  3.431 1.716
log (wage)  log (personal costs per employee)  3.529  0.403  3.401  0.509 
EXshare  export sales / total sales  0.185  0.231  0.000  0.000 
size   number  of  employees  75.218 317.500 25.930 518.705 
productivity  value added per employee  113.689  612.213  90.833  1592.908 
sales per employee  sales  per  employee  207.750 1135.629 157.661 5341.475 
wage  personal costs per employee  37.030  20.483  33.963  21.392 
age  firm age, in years  20.253  19.064  12.832  13.390 
d(foreign sub)   =1, if firm has a foreign subsidiary, 
ownership at least 25% 
0.040 0.196  0.004 0.064 
d(foreign owner)   =1, if firm is owned by a foreign 
company by at least 25% 
0.070 0.256  0.009 0.093 
d(public limited)   =1, if firm's legal form is a "Société 
anonyme" (public limited company) 
0.207 0.405  0.072 0.259 
distance to border  distance to closest border in 100 
kilometers 
1.728 0.913  1.899 0.912 
Note: All monetray values are measured in 1000€  and are deflated by a GDP deflator. 
The comparison of financial indicators between exporters and non-exporters in Table 1 shows 
that exporters are better equipped than non-exporters if liquidity and leverage are taken into 
account. On the other hand there is only a small difference in the interest coverage ratio and 
no difference in the cash flow to capital ratio. The summary statistics also agree with some 
stylized facts. Exporters are on average larger, older and more productive than other firms. 
Further, they pay higher wages and are more innovative as proxied by the value of intangible 
assets. The positive correlation between export status and liquidity may stem from the fact 
that only firms with sufficient liquidity are able to export. On the other hand causality might 
also run from exporting to liquidity as argued by Camper and Shaver (2002) or differences 
may simply be due to correlation with other observed and unobserved factors. For example 16
variables like productivity and size, which are on average higher for exporters, are probably 
positively correlated with financial power.  
As Table A1 shows export participation and intensity vary considerably across industries. 
This may be due to differences in capital intensity or the possibility to realize economies of 
scale, but may also reflect transport costs and differences in firm size and productivity. There 
is a high amount of state dependence in export decisions as Table A2 shows. Only 8.65% 
percent of non-exporters switch to exporting in the next year and almost 85% of exporting 
firms are exporters in the next year. 
  4.2 Empirical specification 
Unfortunately, AMADEUS does not break down export sales by location. Hence, entry into 
different markets cannot be modelled separately and export status is measured by a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the company reports positive sales from exports. For 
comparability with the results from Greenaway et al. (2007) in the main specifications the 
same measure of financial strength is used which they label liquidity. A similar measure is 
sometimes used to analyze the impact of financial constraints on firm investment (see e.g. 
Fazzari and Petersen 1993).  
To check the robustness of the results, alternative measures are considered. First, the long 
term debt to total assets ratio is added to the model, since the liquidity ratio may only 
adequately proxy the availability of external finance if debt is controlled for. The most 
common measure of internal financial capabilities is the cash flow. This measure has been 
subject to critique as cash flow may be correlated with expected future sales and hence, a 
correlation between cash flow and investment may measure other things than financial 
constraints. On the other hand Bond et al. (2003) show that once investment opportunities are 
properly controlled for the cash flow is not a significant predictor of future sales for European 
firms. Further it is usually found that cash flow sensitivities are higher for subgroup of firms 
that are more likely to exhibit financial constraints (see e.g. Carpenter and Petersen 2002). 
The cash flow is normalized by the value of tangible fixed assets as common in the financial 
literature. As a further measure of financial strength the coverage ratio is used.  17
Besides financial indicators and previous export status several control variables that are likely 
to be correlated with exporting and financial constraints are included in the model.
9 These 
variables are assumed to reflect expected revenues and costs from exporting. Theory predicts 
that superior productivity is a determinant of foreign market entry (Helpman et al. 2004). 
Only the most productive firms are able to generate positive profits from exporting as they are 
able to cover transport costs and sunk costs from foreign market entry. Productivity is 
measured as the log of value added per employee. A measure of firm size is included in the 
model which measures firms´ ability to realize economies of scale in production, benefits 
from bulk purchasing and an increasing capacity of taking risks through internal 
diversification (Wagner 1995). The empirical literature also stresses that firm size is 
correlated with the ability to raise finance at low costs (see e.g. Wagner 2001). Firm size is 
measured as the number of employees.  
Exporting firms are often characterized by product differentiation and a high research and 
development (R&D) intensity. Recent theoretical and empirical approaches stress the 
importance of product innovations for foreign market entry in particular (Becker and Egger 
2007). Unfortunately, innovation activities are not directly observed in AMADEUS. 
Intangible assets are used as a proxy for R&D as it is often done in empirical investigations 
using firm level data (see e.g. Budd et al. 2005). Intangible assets enter the equations as a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm reports a positive value of intangible 
assets in its balance sheet. Exporters usually pay higher wages than other firms which has 
been found to reflect mainly different characteristics of the work force (Bernard and Jensen 
1995). In this analysis average wages may capture between-firm variation in skills but also 
differences in production costs. As productivity is controlled for in the estimations, wages 
should be negatively correlated with the firms’ competitiveness. Wages are measured as 
average employment costs per employee. 
Since business practices in foreign markets may be different, firms will have to develop skills 
and knowledge that is specific to a foreign market. The age of the firm can be interpreted as a 
reflection of learning (Jovanovic 1982) and is included the model, measured in years. One of 
the most important determinants of the magnitude of trade between regions is their distance 
(Leamer and Levinsohn 1995). Transport costs are higher the higher the distance to a foreign 
                                                
9 For a survey on export determinants see Greenaway and Kneller (2007). 18
market. Since a major part of French trade is undertaken with other European countries, the 
distance to the closest border, measured in 100 kilometres is included as a regressor.  
Foreign-owned firms are usually found to be more likely to export than indigenous firms 
(Kneller and Pisu 2004). The costs to enter foreign markets might be lower for foreign-owned 
firms since they might benefit from networks and other resources of the parent company. The 
new trade theory emphasises horizontal motives for foreign direct investment (Helpman et al. 
2004). Exports and outward FDI should be substitutes if FDI is motivated by market access. 
Unfortunately information about ownership and subsidiaries is not available for all years in 
the sample. Since these variables seldom change over time the last available ownership status 
is used as it is common practice for this database (see e.g. Konings and Murphy 2006).
10 Two 
dummy variables for foreign ownership and foreign subsidiaries are included in the model. 
To account for differences in governance, legal obligations and risk attitudes across firms, a 
dummy variable for firms that have the legal form of a “Société Anonyme” is included in the 
model. A “Société Anonyme” is equivalent to a public limited company. Differences in the 
tradability of goods, transport costs, competition and technological opportunities across 
industries are accounted for by two-digit industry dummies based on the NACE Rev 1.1 
classification.
11 Time dummies account for macroeconomic factors such as changes in the 
business cycle, market demand and exchange rate movements. 
5. Results  
In Table 2 marginal effects from pooled Tobit and Probit estimates that do not account for 
unobserved heterogeneity are presented for the preferred measures, the liquidity ratio and the 
long term debt ratio. If unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with the regressors, the 
pooled estimator yields consistent parameter estimates. Standard errors are adjusted to allow 
for clustering at the firm level. Columns (1) to (3) show estimation results for the liquidity 
ratio only, in columns (4) to (6) the measure of leverage is added to the model. Marginal 
effects are calculated at the sample averages of the control variables. For comparison with the 
results from the Probit model, marginal effects for the Tobit model are also presented for the 
                                                
10 When restricting the analysis to a subsample of four periods where ownership changes can be tracked it was 
found that this assumption was not crucial for the results. Estimation results are available upon request. 
11 NACE codes 15 (food) and 16 (tobacco) had to be grouped together because of the low number of tobacco 
firms. 19
expected probability of exporting in addition to the expected export share. Full estimation 
results including all control variables are presented in the appendix. Table A3 contains the 
results of dynamic and Table A4 contains for comparison the results of static specifications.
12
It can be seen that the financial measures have the sign that is predicted by theory for both 
export status and export success. The liquidity ratio is positively correlated with exporting, 
while the long term debt ratio is negatively correlated. In contrast to Greenaway et al. (2007) 
the results remain significant when the lagged dependent variable is included. The high and 
significant estimate of the lagged dependent variable shows that the model should be 
estimated dynamically as there is a considerable amount of state dependence. Sign and 
significance of almost all control variables are the same as in the static model. Both the 
expected probability of exporting and the expected export share increases with financial 
health, also after controlling for previous export experience. For example conditional on 
previous export status and the other covariates, firms with a 100% higher liquidity ratio have 
a ten percent higher probability to export, while a 100% higher debt ratio corresponds to a 
decreased probability of exporting of roughly 6.5%.  
The results of the control variables are mostly in line with expectations. Firm size, 
productivity and intangible assets are favorable to exporting.
13 Wages are negatively 
correlated with export performance since they hamper competitiveness for a given level of 
labor productivity. Further, exporting is more likely the older a firm is, and is less likely if a 
firm has a long distance from foreign markets. Firms with a foreign owner are more often 
exporters and export a higher share of their output, while having a foreign subsidiary is 
negatively correlated with a firm’s export share. Public limited firms have a higher propensity 
to export and a higher export share. Comparing the marginal effects for the probability of 
exporting for Tobit and Probit models shows that a separate modelling of incidence and 
intensity does not seem to be necessary, since the estimates are very similar. However, the 
estimation technique does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the 
regressors.  
                                                
12 To make the results comparable to the dynamic specifications the first period is dropped from the estimation 
sample for the static specifications. 
13 A measure of physical capital intensity was also included, but it was never significant in any of the 
specifications. 20
Table 2: Estimation results of pooled Probit and Tobit models 
    (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
  Probit Tobit Tobit  Probit Tobit Tobit 
   Pr (EX>0)  Pr (EX>0) E[EX|EX>0] Pr (EX>0)  Pr (EX>0) E[EX|EX>0]
liquidity ratio  0.097***  0.101*** 0.013***  0.098***  0.102*** 0.013*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.001) 
leverage       -0.065***  -0.112***  -0.014*** 
            (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.002) 
Contol variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry and time dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
σ   0.263 0.263    0.263 0.263 
 (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
log  (Pseudo-)Likelihood  -116824.73 -63169.76 -63169.76  -116689.94 -63065.04 -63065.04 
N  207158  207158 207158  207158  207158 207158 
pseudo R-squared  0.196        0.196       
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Marginal effects are reported, calculated 
at the sample means of the regressors. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level are shown in parantheses.  
Table 3 presents the results for dynamic random effect estimations that control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Full estimation results are presented in Table A5. The coefficients of the 
financial indicators become insignificant. This is the case, no matter if the impact on export 
status or export intensity is investigated and whether leverage is included or not. As Table A5 
shows, financial indicators are highly and significantly correlated with time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity which can be seen from the coefficient of the firm specific mean 
values. The liquidity ratio is positively correlated, while leverage is negatively correlated. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is substantial and explains between 40 and 50 percent of the 
variance of the dependent variables as indicated by the estimate for ρ.  
Thus, it seems that cross-sectional estimates overestimate the impact of financial factors. The 
reason is probably that financial factors are positively correlated with unobserved factors such 
as managerial ability, technological opportunities or attitudes towards risk that positively 
affect exporting. 21
Table 3: Dynamic Random Effect Estimates 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Probit  Probit  Tobit  Tobit 
   Pr (EX>0)  Pr (EX>0) E[EX|EX>0]  E[EX|EX>0] 
liquidity ratio  -0.002 -0.015 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
leverage   0.028   0.002 
   (0.026)   (0.002) 
Control  variables  yes yes yes yes 
Industry and time dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
σa 0.881 0.880 0.104 0.104 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) 
σu   0.105  0.105 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ρ 0.437 0.436 0.492 0.492 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
log Likelihood  -66001.556  -65879.479  31483.996  13813.983 
N  207158 207158 207158 207158 
pseudo R-squared  0.48  0.48       
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Marginal effects are reported, 
calculated at the sample means of the unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are shown in 
parantheses.  
In Table 4 separate estimations for the export status of incumbents and potential entrants are 
presented to investigate whether financial factors are relevant for market entry rather than for 
maintenance of presence in foreign markets. Estimations results presented in columns (1) and 
(2) assume that regressors are uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity while columns (3) 
and (4) show estimation results that allow for a correlation. Table A6 shows full estimation 
results. Leverage is significantly negatively correlated with foreign market entry but not with 
maintenance of the export status of incumbent firms. The liquidity ratio is significantly 
correlated with the export status for both groups of firms, but the correlation with the export 
status of potential entrants is higher. However, when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into 
account this effect disappears. Other firm-level characteristics such as labor productivity, size 
and past export status remain significant.
14  
                                                
14 Estimating a separate probit equation for incumbents and potential entrants without correcting for endogenous 
previous export status yielded similar results. The same is true if a linear probability model with or without a 
probit selection equation was used instead. Thus, the crucial point is to take unobserved heterogeneity into 
account and not to correct for endogenous selection. 22
Export market entry as well as enhancements of export intensity seems to be rather driven by 
productivity and employment growth than by movements in financial liquidity. Thus, it seems 
that sunk costs for foreign market entry for French manufacturing firms are not that high that 
financial constraints matter. At least for the group of firms that can expect positive profits 
from exporting, financial constraints are not binding because of their high productivity, size 
and other characteristics.  
Table 4: Separate estimations for incumbents and potential entrants 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  entrants incumbents  entrants incumbents 
liquidity ratio  0.252*** 0.111*** -0.068  -0.061 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.052) (0.063) 
leverage  -0.244*** -0.038  0.151  -0.180 
    (0.078) (0.086) (0.107) (0.137) 
control  variables  yes yes yes yes 
mean values of time invariant variables no  no  yes  yes 
Industry and time dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
log  (Pseudo-)Likelihood  -122192.3 -120926.7 -113694.4 -112725.4 
N  171450 171450 171450 171450 
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Marginal effects that refer to the 
probability of exporting conditional on previous year's export status are reported. Marginal effects are 
calculated at the sample means of the regressors. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level are shown 
in parantheses. 
In Table A7 the equations for export status and export share are estimated with alternative 
financial measures, the interest coverage ratio and the cash flow to capital ratio. The results 
are very similar to the specification with liquidity since the coefficients for cash flow and 
coverage ratio are close to zero and insignificant. No direct impact of financial factors on 
exporting can be identified; hence, there is no evidence that firms are hindered from exporting 
by financial constraints.  
The results so far may be driven by the fact that financial constraints are only relevant for 
certain types of firms. Therefore, the sample is split into some sub groups to investigate 
whether there are heterogeneous effects. In his theoretical model, Chaney (2005) argues that 
liquidity only matters for exporting decisions within a medium range of productivity. 
Therefore the model is estimated separately for the 2
nd and the 3
rd quartile of the distribution 
of labor productivity across firms. It is often argued that financial constraints are more severe 23
for smaller firms (see e.g. Carpenter and Petersen 2002). To check whether financial factors 
matter for small firms, separate estimations for the 1
st and 2
nd quartile of the size distribution 
(measured as the number of employees) were performed. 
The macroeconomic literature predicts that the importance of finance differs between capital 
and labor intensive industries (Manova 2005) and that financial factors matter in particular for 
scale intensive industries (Beck 2002). Further, sunk costs may differ across industries 
because of product characteristics, e.g. R&D and advertising intensity. Although the analysis 
was already restricted to manufacturing firms, sunk costs and capital intensity may differ 
substantially across industries. To investigate whether financial constraints matter in certain 
industries separate estimations for labor and capital intensive industries and for industries in 
which low and high sunk costs can be expected, are performed. The classification of 
industries is shown in Table A8 and is closely related to Davies and Lions (1996).
15
Table A9 shows estimation results for dynamic Probit estimates with liquidity ratio and 
leverage as financial indicators for the various mentioned subgroups. Only the coefficients for 
the financial variables are presented. Control variables are the same as in the previous 
estimations. For none of the subgroups a positive impact of the financial indicators can be 
confirmed. Hence, the previous estimation results are not driven by an inappropriate pooling 
of industries or firms that are dependent on external finance to a different extent. 
Unfortunately the impact of financial factors cannot be decomposed by destination, since 
AMADEUS does not provide this information. Sunk costs probably differ across foreign 
target markets and a major part of French trade is conducted with other European countries. In 
contrast trading partners differ across industries and there was no evidence for heterogeneous 
effects in the estimations. 
As already mentioned the assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressors might be violated. 
For example exporting may reduce future liquidity if firms have to raise a high amount of 
investments to achieve or maintain their export status at least in the short run. In the long run, 
exporting may have a positive impact on liquidity as suggested by Guariglia and Mateut 
(2005) and Greenaway et al. (2007). A similar argument may be relevant for other regressors 
such as firm size and labor productivity, although recent evidence suggests that causality 
rather runs from firm performance such as productivity to exports and not vice versa (see 
                                                
15  The classification according to the height of sunk costs is partly overlapping with the classification according 
to capital intensity and with high-tech industries.24
Wagner 2007 for an overview). A further disadvantage of the maximum likelihood procedure 
is that the estimations are not robust to the distributional assumptions of the error term.
16
To check whether the previous results where driven by these assumptions, I estimate a linear 
probability model for the export dummy using a GMM system estimator.
17 Compared to the 
Probit estimates the GMM estimator has the disadvantage that it does not account for the 
binary nature of the dependent variable, hence the predicted probabilities are not necessarily 
bounded between zero and one. Within this estimation framework all regressors are treated as 
potentially endogenous. Hence, I use as instruments levels lagged two periods and more for 
the equations in first differences and lagged differences for the equations in levels. The two-
step estimator which has been found to be more efficient than the one-step estimator 
(Windmeijer 2005) is used for estimation. To adjust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and 
possible autocorrelation the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction is used.
18  
Table A10 reports the results for the GMM estimates. The results are similar to the non-linear 
estimation techniques. In all specifications the coefficients of the financial indicators become 
very small and insignificant. As the difference in Hansen test statistics for the validity of the 
instruments for the level equations shows, the validity of these instruments cannot be rejected. 
Further, the results of the Arellano-Bond-test for autocorrelation show that lagged levels and 
differences are valid instruments, since there is no evidence for autocorrelation of second 
order in the difference equations.
19 The Hansen test for the validity of all instruments (for 
level and difference equations) is only rejected for the equation with the coverage ratio as 
financial indicator. Since the results are very similar across estimation techniques and 
financial measures, the GMM estimates can be taken as further confirmation of the previous 
results. Strict exogeneity cannot easily be relaxed in equations with censored outcome 
variables as the export share. But estimating the export share equations as a fractional Probit 
                                                
16 Another critical assumption of the random effect estimator is the independence of observations across time 
conditional on the regressors and unobserved heterogeneity. However, estimating the models with pooled Probit 
and Tobit techniques with the mean values of the time-varying variables -which does not assume independence 
across observations- yielded the same conclusions for the financial measures. Results from these estimations are 
available upon request. 
17 An alternative estimator is the “Difference GMM” estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The 
problem with difference GMM is that lagged levels can be weak instruments for difference equations when there 
is high persistence in the variables (Blundell and Bond 1998a), which is typically the case if variables such as 
exports and productivity are used. Hence, the GMM system estimator which has been found to outperform the 
difference GMM estimator in the case of highly persistent variables (Blundell and Bond 1998b) is used here.  
18 Estimation was carried out in STATA
®, version 10.0. The command xtabond2 (Roodman 2006) was used for 
estimation. 
19 This is equivalent to no autocorrelation of first order in the level equations. 25
model as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (2005), which is more robust to violations of the 
distributional assumptions than the Tobit model, yielded similar results. 
To summarize, it cannot be confirmed that French manufacturing firms are hindered from 
exporting by financial constraints, since the correlation between exports and financial 
indicators does not seem to reflect a causal relationship from financial factors to foreign 
market entry. It rather seems that there are unobserved factors such as corporate strategy and 
managerial ability that help a firm both to enter foreign markets and to achieve financial 
strength. 
6 Conclusion  
Recent theoretical approaches from both macro- and microeconomic models predict that 
financial factors can be an important determinant of trade. Using a large panel data set of 
French manufacturing firms, this paper analyzes the impact of financial constraints on export 
participation and sales in foreign markets. A first look at the data showed that exporters are 
characterized by better financial equipment at least for some financial indicators. Financial 
factors are a significant predictor of export participation and the height of the export share 
after controlling for past export status, industry and standard control variables predicted by 
previous empirical and theoretical approaches. Once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into 
account the effects disappear. Thus, there is no evidence that financial constraints matter for 
export decisions. The reason for this result is probably that the selective group of firms for 
whom exporting is relevant is not likely to face financial constraints for foreign market entry. 
It rather seems that there are unobservable characteristics that enable a firm both to enter 
foreign markets and to achieve financial strength. An alternative explanation is that financial 
factors indeed matter, but public measures for export activities have reduced financial 
constraints for foreign market entry.  
The results are robust across different model specifications and also hold for sub-groups of 
firms that are more likely to face financial constraints and for industries in which scale 
economies and sunk costs may be relevant in particular. The results have a direct policy 
implication. To increase export activities it seems to be more important to enhance firms´ 
innovation activities or productivity enhancing investments than to finance trade credits or to 
subsidize loans for exporting activities - at least in highly developed countries. Financial 26
constraints may only have an indirect effect on exporting activities. If financial constraints 
hamper domestic growth, investment and innovation, they may also hinder firms from 
exporting in the long run. For future research it might be interesting to compare the impact of 
financial constraints on exports across different countries. It is possible that financial 
constraints matter for trade in less developed countries or countries with different financial 
institutions. Further it might be interesting to investigate whether the impact of financial 
factors is different for entry into different target markets. 27
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Appendix  
Table A1: Distribution of exporters across industries 
NACE code  Description 
share of firms





15-16  food and tobacco  17.91%  15.93%  2.44% 
17 textiles  2.74%  55.35%  13.74% 
18  wearing apparel and accessories  3.30%  55.38%  14.18% 
19 
tanning and dressing of leather; 
luggage. 0.94%  52.84%  11.47% 
20  wood and wood products  4.00%  34.94%  6.56% 
21  pulp, paper and paper products  1.11%  56.63%  8.31% 
22  publishing and printing  13.66%  28.76%  2.98% 
23 
coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel  0.09%  37.16%  3.78% 
24 chemicals  and  chemical  products 2.53%  63.12%  18.22% 
25  rubber and plastic products  3.39%  55.40%  9.42% 
26 
other non-metallic mineral 
products  3.62% 26.04% 4.52% 
27 basic  metals  0.77%  62.60%  15.88% 
28 fabricated  metal  products  16.89%  34.62%  5.20% 
29  machinery and equipment n.e.c.  8.19%  39.10%  8.09% 
30 office  machinery  and  computers  0.29%  41.05%  10.42% 
31 
electrical machinery and apparatus 
n.e.c. 3.53%  38.67%  7.90% 
32 
television and communication 
equipment   1.52% 41.50% 9.48% 
33 
medical, precision and optical 
instruments  4.89% 30.06% 6.88% 
34 
motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 1.30%  42.97%  8.33% 
35  other transport equipment  1.29%  44.42%  10.79% 
36 furniture;  manufacturing  n.e.c.  6.57%  31.18%  5.53% 
37 recycling  1.46%  37.27%  8.60% 
   all  100.00%  34.03%  6.30% 
Table A2: Transition probabilities 
   Export status in: 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 
Export status in t :  Non-Exporter  Exporter  Non-Exporter Exporter  Non-Exporter Exporter 
Non-Exporter 91.35% 8.65%  88.71% 11.29%  86.88%  13.12% 
Exporter 15.25%  84.75%  19.07% 80.93%  21.53%  78.47% 32
Table A3: Dynamic specification - pooled estimates 
    (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit  Tobit  Tobit  Probit  Tobit  Tobit 
   Pr(EX>0) Pr(EX>0)  E[EX|EX>0]  Pr(EX>0) Pr(EX>0) E[EX|EX>0] 
liquidity ratio  0.097***  0.101*** 0.013***  0.098*** 0.102*** 0.013*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.001)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) 
leverage        -0.065*** -0.112*** -0.014*** 
            (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.002) 
EXshare (t-1)   3.038***  0.391***    3.038***  0.391*** 
 (0.029)  (0.002)    (0.029)  (0.002) 
dEX (t-1)  0.713***     0.713***     
   (0.002)        (0.002)       
log size  0.069***  0.061*** 0.008***  0.068*** 0.060*** 0.008*** 
  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
log productivity  0.140***  0.131*** 0.017***  0.140*** 0.130*** 0.017*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) 
d(R&D)  0.031***  0.035*** 0.004***  0.032*** 0.036*** 0.005*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
log wage  -0.080***  -0.073*** -0.009***  -0.081*** -0.074*** -0.010*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) 
d(foreign sub)  -0.003 -0.025***  -0.003***  -0.002  -0.023***  -0.003*** 
  (0.012)  (0.006) (0.001)  (0.012) (0.006) (0.001) 
d(foreign owner)  0.063***  0.032*** 0.004***  0.064*** 0.033*** 0.004*** 
  (0.009)  (0.005) (0.001)  (0.009) (0.005) (0.001) 
d(public limited)  0.034***  0.040*** 0.005***  0.033*** 0.039*** 0.005*** 
  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) 
log age  0.016***  0.020*** 0.003***  0.016*** 0.019*** 0.002*** 
(0.002)  (0.002) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
distance to border  -0.027***  -0.026*** -0.003***  -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.003*** 
   (0.002)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
σ    0.128  0.128     0.128  0.128 
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001) 
(Pseudo-)logL -70928.18  18129.64  18129.64 -70864.99  18163.59  18163.59 
N  207158  207158 207158  207158 207158 207158 
pseudo R-squared  0.511        0.511      
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. All regressions include industry and time 
dummies. Marginal effects are reported, calculated at the sample means of the regressors. Standard errors, 
clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.  33
Table A4: Static estimates for export status and export share 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Probit  Tobit  Tobit  Probit  Tobit  Tobit 
   Pr (EX>0)  Pr (EX>0)  E[EX|EX>0] Pr  (EX>0) Pr (EX>0)  E[EX|EX>0] 
liquidity ratio  0.190*** 0.155***  0.034***  0.191*** 0.155*** 0.034*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.002) 
leverage       -0.131***  -0.118***  -0.026*** 
            (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.005) 
log size  0.123*** 0.095***  0.021***  0.122*** 0.095*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
log productivity  0.237*** 0.209***  0.046***  0.236*** 0.208*** 0.046*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.001) 
d(R&D)  0.061*** 0.036***  0.008***  0.062*** 0.037*** 0.008*** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
log wage  -0.121*** -0.087***  -0.019***  -0.123*** -0.088*** -0.019*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.002) 
d(foreign sub)  0.007 0.102***  0.024***  0.010 0.104***  0.024*** 
 (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.003) 
d(foreign owner)  0.135*** 0.198***  0.049***  0.136*** 0.198*** 0.050*** 
 (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.003) 
d(public limited)  0.069*** 0.053***  0.012***  0.069*** 0.052*** 0.012*** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
log age  0.046*** 0.023***  0.005***  0.044*** 0.022*** 0.005*** 
(0.004) (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
distance to border  -0.054*** -0.048***  -0.011***  -0.055*** -0.049*** -0.011*** 
   (0.003) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
σ    0.263  0.263     0.263  0.263 
 (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
(Pseudo-)logL -116824.7  -63169.8  -63169.8 -116689.9  -63065.0  -63065.0 
N 207158  207158  207158  207158  207158  207158 
Pseudo R-squared  0.196        0.196       
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Al regressions include industry and time 
dummies. Marginal effects are reported, calculated at the sample means of the regressors. Standard errors, 
clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.  34
Table A5: Dynamic Random-Effect Models 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Probit  Probit  Tobit  Tobit 
   Pr (EX>0)  Pr (EX>0) E[EX|EX>0]  E[EX|EX>0] 
liquidity ratio  -0.002 -0.015 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
leverage   0.028    0.002 
     (0.026)    (0.002) 
EXshare (t-1)    0.158***  0.158*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
dEX (t-1)  0.370*** 0.370***    
   (0.004) (0.004)      
log size  0.107*** 0.108*** 0.011***  0.011*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
log productivity  0.103*** 0.103*** 0.015***  0.015*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
d(R&D)  -0.004 -0.004 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
log wage  -0.022* -0.020* -0.006***  -0.006*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
d(foreign sub)  -0.013 -0.007 -0.003**  -0.003** 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
d(foreign owner)  0.058*** 0.064*** 0.006***  0.006*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
d(public limited)  0.037*** 0.036*** 0.007***  0.006*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
log age  0.011*** 0.005*  0.002***  0.002*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) 
distance to border  -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.004***  -0.004*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) 
EXshare (t=0)        0.196***  0.196*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
dEX (t=0)  0.438*** 0.435***    
(0.007) (0.007)    
Mean liquidity ratio  0.120*** 0.149*** 0.003***  0.003*** 
 (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Mean leverage   -0.161***    -0.029*** 
   (0.040)    (0.004) 
        
Mean log size  -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.001*  -0.002** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        
Mean log productivity  0.070*** 0.067*** 0.007***  0.007*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.001) 35
Table A5-continued from previous page 
Mean d(R&D)  0.046*** 0.055*** 0.007***  0.007*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Mean log wage  -0.087*** -0.095*** -0.006***  -0.006*** 
   (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
σa 0.881 0.880 0.104  0.104 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.001)  (0.001) 
σu   0.105  0.105 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ρ 0.437 0.436 0.492  0.492 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004)  (0.004) 
log  Likelihood  -66001.556 -65879.479 31483.996  13813.983 
N 207158  207158  207158  207158 
pseudo R-squared  0.48  0.48       
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Al regressions include industry and 
time dummies. Marginal effects are reported, calculated at the sample means of the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 36
Table A6: Heterogeneous effects for incumbents and potential entrants 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
entrants incumbents  entrants incumbents 
liquidity ratio  0.252*** 0.111***  -0.068  -0.061 
(0.030) (0.030)  (0.052) (0.063) 
leverage  -0.244*** -0.038  0.151  -0.180 
    (0.078) (0.086)  (0.107) (0.137) 
log size  0.220*** 0.087***  0.182*** 0.215*** 
(0.010) (0.010)  (0.032) (0.038) 
log productivity  0.453*** 0.189***  0.198*** 0.234*** 
(0.022) (0.021)  (0.041) (0.043) 
d(R&D)  0.110*** 0.038***  -0.003  -0.022 
(0.015) (0.014)  (0.022) (0.025) 
log wage  -0.239*** -0.150***  -0.041  -0.044 
(0.029) (0.028)  (0.047) (0.055) 
d(foreign sub)  -0.081 0.083** -0.037 0.092** 
(0.074) (0.036)  (0.072) (0.036) 
d(foreign owner)  0.266*** 0.099***  0.343*** 0.106*** 
(0.056) (0.028)  (0.053) (0.028) 
d(public limited)  0.139*** 0.017  0.164*** 0.015 
(0.021) (0.015)  (0.020) (0.015) 
log age  0.059*** 0.027***  0.079*** 0.025*** 
(0.012) (0.010)  (0.012) (0.010) 
distance to border  -0.101*** -0.033***  -0.130*** -0.030*** 
(0.008) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.007) 
mean values of time invariant variables  no  no  yes  yes 
Pseudo  log  likelihood  -122192.3 -120926.7  -113694.4 -112725.4 
N  171450 171450  171450 171450 
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. All regressions include industry and 
time dummies.  Marginal effects that refer to the probability of exporting conditional on previous 
year's export status are reported. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the regressors. 
Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parentheses. 37
Table A7: Alternative financial measures- dynamic random effect models 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Probit  Probit  Tobit  Tobit 
Pr (EX>0)  Pr (EX>0) E[EX|EX>0] E[EX|EX>0] 
cash flow ratio  -0.001   -0.000*   
(0.002)   (0.000)   
coverage ratio   -0.000    -0.000* 
      (0.000)     (0.000) 
EXshare (t-1)     0.166***  0.190*** 
     (0.002)  (0.002) 
dEX (t-1)  0.397*** 0.404***     
   (0.004) (0.005)         
log size  0.104*** 0.111***  0.011***  0.012*** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
log productivity  0.109*** 0.102***  0.016***  0.017*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
d(R&D)  -0.007 -0.003  -0.000  0.000 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
log wage  -0.031** -0.013  -0.007***  -0.007*** 
 (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
d(foreign sub)  -0.012 -0.009  -0.003***  -0.002 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
d(foreign owner)  0.055*** 0.057***  0.006***  0.007*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
d(public limited)  0.036*** 0.033***  0.006***  0.007*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
log age  0.015*** 0.017***  0.003***  0.003*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
distance to border  -0.025*** -0.026***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
σa 0.835 0.834  0.101  0.096 
(0.013) (0.013)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
σu    0.104  0.102 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
ρ 0.411 0.398  0.486  0.471 
(0.007) (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
log Likelihood  -60928.62  -55005.753  29834.564  33956.792 
N 191244  168009  191244  168009 
pseudo R-squared  0.52  0.43       
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. All regressions include firm specific 
time averages of the time-varying regressors, the initial export status, time dummies and industry 
dummies Marginal effects are reported, calculated at the sample means of the unobserved 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A9: Heterogenous effects - dynamic Probit models 
a) sample split by sunk costs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sample  sunk costs  sunk cost   sunk cost   sunk cost  
 low  R&D  advertising  high 
liquidity ratio  -0.018 0.031  -0.029 -0.027 
(0.018) (0.086) (0.036) (0.066) 
leverage  0.021 0.132 0.121 0.061 
  (0.034) (0.128) (0.077) (0.132) 
N 156608  6416  32262  11074 
pseudo  R-squared  0.525 0.551 0.520 0.522 
               
b) sample split by production technology 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sample  scale economies  capital intensive  labor intensive  high tech 
liquidity ratio  -0.018 0.001  0.011  -0.006 
(0.018) (0.029) (0.036) (0.034) 
leverage  0.021 0.057 -0.025  0.046 
(0.034) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) 
N 156608  52708  40118  42901 
pseudo  R-squared  0.525 0.495 0.627 0.553 
               
c) sample split by size and productivity 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sample  size size produtivity  productivity 
  1st quartile  2nd quartile  2nd quartile  3rd quartile 
liquidity ratio  -0.005 -0.033 -0.010 0.005 
(0.021) (0.029) (0.034) (0.032) 
leverage  0.051 -0.024  0.002 0.054 
(0.038) (0.053) (0.066) (0.064) 
N  30669 40993 46414 51191 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.488 0.491 0.517 0.506 
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Marginal effects are reported, 
calculated at the sample means of the unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. All regressions include control variables from the previous specifications, firm specific 
time averages of the time-varying regressors, the initial export status, time dummies and industry 
dummies on the two-digit NACE level for those industries that are included in the sub sample. 40
Table A10: GMM-System estimates for export status 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
liquidity ratio  -0.056       
   (0.035)       
leverage  -0.046       
   (0.049)       
cash flow ratio     -0.011    
      (0.009)    
coverage ratio        -0.000 
         (0.000) 
dEX (t-1)  0.428***  0.419***  0.448*** 
   (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.068) 
dEX (t-2)  0.060***  0.062***  0.065*** 
   (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
log size  0.086***  0.069**  0.067*** 
   (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.021) 
log productivity  0.163***  0.225***  0.153*** 
   (0.052)  (0.067)  (0.056) 
d(R&D)  -0.021  -0.024  0.007 
   (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.021) 
log wage  -0.110*  -0.147*  -0.111 
   (0.060)  (0.080)  (0.085) 
m1(p)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
m2(p)  0.432  0.378  0.378 
Hansen (p)  0.311  0.483  0.035 
Difference Hansen (p)  0.995  0.999  0.315 
N  171450  175439  155739 
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. All regressions include 
industry and time dummies. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. In all columns 
instruments used are levels lagged two periods and deeper for the equation in differences and 
differences lagged one period and deeper for the equation in levels. m1 (m2) is a test of the null 
hypothesis of no first (second) order serial correlation for the difference equation. Hansen is a 
test on the overidentifying restrictions based on the two-step GMM estimator. Difference 
Hansen is a test of the validity of the additional instruments in differences for the equation in 
levels. For all test statistics, p-values are reported. 